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O.C.G.A. §§ 9-10-31 (amended), 9-10-
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SB 3 
1 
2005 Ga. Laws 1 
The Act provides for civil justice 
reform in Georgia, amending Titles 9, 
24, 33, 43, and 51 of the Official Code 
of Georgia Annotated. The Act 
addresses venue for cases involving 
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joint defendants and the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens. It also amends 
procedures relating to affidavits in 
professional malpractice cases by 
requiring that the plaintiff file, with the 
complaint, an affidavit of an expert 
competent to testify. In addition, the 
Act also requires authorizing the 
release of the plaintiff's medical 
information in medical malpractice 
cases. The Act further provides 
guidelines associated with offers of 
settlement and the reduction of 
frivolous lawsuits. Moreover, the Act 
provides that courts shall not admit 
certain statements of apology or similar 
statements by health care providers as 
evidence in civil actions. It also 
changes the standards of expert 
testimony and expert witness 
qualification. The Act requires 
reporting instances of medical 
malpractice judgments and settlements 
and provides for investigations and 
remedial actions with respect to 
physicians' fitness to practice. Further, 
the Act addresses liability in the 
emergency room context and liability 
involving independent contractors. It 
also eliminates joint and several 
liability in favor of apportionment of 
damages according to degree of fault. 
The Act also provides a cap on 
noneconomic damages in certain 
actions relating to health care and 
allows for periodic payments over time. 
The Act concludes by providing for 
severability, designating. an effective 
date, and repealing conflicting laws. 
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EFFECTIVE DATE: February 16, 2005 
History 
Tort reform is one of the most polarizing and controversial issues 
that society faces today. 1 Year after year, opposing sides set the 
battlefield and draw the lines.2 States throughout the country have 
struggled with the issue.3 The controversy pits Republicans against 
Democrats, doctors against lawyers, and business advocates against 
consumer advocates.4 
In Georgia, the issue divides not only along party lines but also 
within them.5 In 2004, as in previous years, the Georgia Legislature 
unsuccessfully attempted to pass tort reform.6 In 2004, the focus of 
HB 1028 was specifically on medical malpractice.7 It would have 
given rural hospitals the ability to self-insure, provided limited 
liability associated with independent contractors, and eliminated joint 
and several liability.8 The bill ultimately failed in Conference 
Committee over the issue of caps on noneconomic damages.9 
The same players came to the table during the 2005 legislative 
session for consideration of SB 3.10 Lawmakers heard many views 
throughout the lengthy process--over 20 combined hours of 
testimony from both chambers.ll Many claimed Georgia needed tort 
reform due to the ever increasing medical malpractice insurance 
1. Sonji Iacobs, Panel Weighs Malpractice Issue; Tort Refonn Would Cap Injury Awards, 
ATLANTA J. CONST., Ian. 25, 2005, at B 1. 
2. See id. 
3. See Douglas Heller & Allison Wall, 'Cap' Cheats Patients and Doctors, ATLANTA J. CONST., 
Feb. 3,2005, atPL15. 
4. See id.; Greg Bluestein, More Get in on the Tort Refonn Act, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Jan. 
26, 2005, at 26; Bill Rankin, LEGISLATURE '05: THE BIG ISSUES: Malpractice Fight Renewed; As 
Republicans Take Over House, Doctors, Lawyers Prepare to Slug it Out Again Over Jury Awards and 
Medical Liability, ATLANTA I. CONST., Jan. 2,2005, at CI. 
5. Rankin, supra note 4. 
6. Id. 
7. Review of Selected 2004 Georgia Legislation, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 178,182-94 (2004). 
8. Id. 
9. Id. 
10. Bluestein, supra note 4; Greg Bluestein, Bar Won't Budge on Tort Reform, FuLTON COUNTY 
DAILY REP., Jan. 19,2005, at 19; Rankin, supra note 4. 
11. See PLudio Recording of Senate Proceedings, Feb. 1, 2005, 
http://www.georgia.gov/00/artic1eJO,2086,4802_61 071 03_33091490,00.html [hereinafter Senate PLudioj; 
Audio Recording of House Proceedings, Feb. 10, 2005, 
hnp:l/www.georgia.gov/00/artic1eJO,2086,4802_61 07103_33078458,00.html [hereinafter House Audio j; 
Greg Bluestein, Damages Caps Divide House GOP, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Feb. 8, 2005, at 8. 
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premiums resulting from large jury awards and settlements. 12 
Specifically, the Medical Association of Georgia feared that without 
tort reform, they would not be able to attract and retain an adequate 
number of doctors to sustain the state's needs. 13 Additionally, the 
Georgia Chamber of Commerce believed that "tort reform would 
translate into a better business climate" for the state. 14 In particular, 
the National Federation of Independent Business felt that with civil 
justice reform, small businesses would be less of a target for trial 
lawyers. 15 
While many voiced the need for civil justice reform, opponents 
saw tort reform as coming at too great a cost. 16 The opponents argued 
tort reform will restrict access to the courts and deny victims the right 
to compensation for their injuries. 17 Further, they claimed tort reform 
will hinder wrongdoers' accountability for their acts. IS They also 
argued that while many other states have enacted tort reform 
legislation, the overwhelming majority have not seen a reduction in 
insurance premiums. 19 
Bill Tracking of SB 3 
Consideration by the Senate 
Senators Preston Smith, Eric Johnson, Mitch Seabaugh, Bill 
Stephens, and William Hamrick of the 52nd, 1st, 28th, 27th, and 30th 
districts, respectively, sponsored SB 3.20 The Senate first read the bill 
on January 11, 2005, and the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably 
reported the bill, by substitute, on January 28,2005.21 
12. Jay Bookman. For Cruelty. Malpractice Cap Tops All. ATLANTA J. CONST .• Feb. 14. 2005. at 
All. 
13. Bluestein. supra note 4. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. See discussion infra notes 16-IS. 
17. Rankin. supra note 4. 
IS. Bluestein. supra note 4. 
19. Weiss Ratings. Inc .• The Impact of Noneconomic Damage Caps on Physician Premiums, Claims 
Payout Levels, and Availability of Coverage. June 3. 2002. 
http://www.weissmtings.comlmalpmctice.asp. 
20. See SB 3. as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
21. See State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 3. Jan. II. 2005 (May II, 2005); State of 
Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet. SB 3, Jan. 2S, 2005 (May II. 2005). 
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The Bill, As Introduced 
As introduced, SB 3 would have amended Titles 9, 24, and 51 of 
the Official Code of Georgia Annotated.22 Lawmakers proposed to 
amend various civil procedure rules, evidence rules, and tort laws.23 
Its sponsors introduced the bill as a response to the rising cost of 
hospital and medical liability insurance while also addressing the 
need for general reform regarding civil actions.24 
Section 2 of the bill, as introduced, replaced Code section 9-10-31 
and inserted in its place a revised section 9-10-31 and the new section 
9-10-31.1, which addressed venue in cases with joint defendants.25 
The proposed section allows plaintiffs to bring a case in a jurisdiction 
where one of the defendants resides, but it permits transferring the 
case to an appropriate venue if the plaintiff drops that defendant from 
the suit.26 
As introduced, section 3 of the bill focused on expert testimony in 
professional malpractice cases.27 It amended Code section 9-11-9.1 
by requiring contemporaneous filings of affidavits in all 
circumstances without exception.28 
As introduced, section 4 of the bill created new Code section 9-11-
9.2, requiring contemporaneous filing of a medical authorization 
form with the complaint in medical malpractice actions.29 The 
authorization allows the attorneys representing the defendant "to 
obtain and disclose protected health information" from medical 
records, except privileged information, to assist in "the investigation, 
evaluation, and defense of . . . allegations set forth in the 
complaint. ,,30 The authorization allows "the defendant's attorney 
[the] right to discuss the care and treatment of the plaintiff ... with 
the plaintiffs ... physicians.,,3l Failure to attach this authorization 
can result in dismissal of the suit. 32 
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Section 5 of the bill, as introduced, proposed the addition of Code 
section 9-15-16, which would penalize either the plaintiff or the 
defendant for rejecting a reasonable offer of judgment by requiring 
them to pay the opposing party's attorney's fees. 33 The bill provided 
specific instructions for offer of judgment procedures by setting out 
offer requirements and adding separate penalty provisions for 
defendants and plaintiffs.34 One provision states: 
if a defendant files an offer of judgment which is not accepted by 
the plaintiff within 30 days, the defendant shall be entitled to 
recover reasonable costs and attorney's fees incurred by him or 
her or on the defendant's behalf pursuant to a policy of liability 
insurance or other contract from the date of filing of the offer if 
the judgment is one of no liability or the judgment obtained by 
the plaintiff is at least 25 percent less than such offer, and the 
court shall set off such costs and attorney's fees against the 
award.3s 
The bill also provided specific language relating to the plaintiff by 
requiring that: 
[i]f a plaintiff files a demand for judgment which is not accepted 
by the defendant within 30 days and the plaintiff recovers a 
judgment in an amount of at least 25 percent greater than the 
offer, he or she shall be entitled to recover reasonable costs and 
attorney's fees incurred from the date of the ftling of the 
demand.36 
In addition, the bill provided a "bad faith" exception allowing the 
court to determine whether to impose the penalty.37 
33. [d. 
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Section 6 added Code section 24-3-37.1 relating to the 
admissibility of admissions by health care providers. The section 
provided: 
any and all statements, afftrmations, gestures, activities or 
conduct expressing benevolence, regret, apology, sympathy, 
commiseration, condolence, compassion, fault, or a general 
sense of benevolence which are made by a health care provider 
or an employee or agent of a health care provider to the patient, a 
relative of a patient, or representative of the patient [relating] to 
the unanticipated outcome shall be inadmissible as evidence ... 
38 
Section 7 completely replaced Code section 24-9-67.39 The new 
section codified the Daubert standard for the admissibility of expert 
testimony, and in professional malpractice actions, it provided that 
expert opinions regarding the appropriate standard of care is 
admissible only if the expert holds a proper state license.4O 
Additionally, in medical malpractice actions, the section required that 
the expert has "actual professional knowledge and experience in the 
area of practice or specialty" and regularly engages in active practice 
in that area for a specified amount of time prior to the action, taught 
in the specific area of practice at least part-time at an accredited 
teaching institution, or "any combination of the active practice or the 
teaching ... for at least three of the last five years.'.41 
Section 8 added new Code section 51-1-29.5, which addressed the 
special nature of the emergency room environment.42 The section 
required plaintiffs to prove "willful or wanton misconduct" in order 
to recover for noneconomic damages in that setting.43 These 
limitations to liability did not apply to any act or omission while 
rendering care or assistance unrelated to the original medical 
condition that occurs 24 hours after the hospital began giving such 
38. [d. 
39. [d. 
40. SB 3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.; see generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 
509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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care.44 Additionally, the limitations did not apply to any act or 
omission during the. rendering of care to a pregnant woman in active 
labor or who has previously received prenatal care from that hospital 
for that pregnancy.45 
Section 9 provided new Code section 51-2-5.1, which limited 
hospital liability to actions of their agents and employees, provided 
specific guidelines hospitals must follow to inform the public to 
relieve liability from actions of independent contractors, and required 
patients to sign a waiver relating to limiting such liability.46 The bill 
set forth factors for determining whether someone is an agent or 
independent contractor for liability purposes.47 
Section 10 replaced Code section 51-12-31, providing that in a 
case brought against several joint tortfeasors, a plaintiff may only 
recover damages against a defendant who was actually liable for the 
injury.48 The bill also replaced Code section 51-12-33 with a new 
section requiring the fact-finder to determine the percentage of 
negligence of the plaintiff and to reduce the amount of damages in 
proportion to that negligence.49 Additionally, the fact-finder will 
apportion the damages among the defendants who are actually liable 
according to the degree of fault for each party, thus eliminating joint 
and several liability and any right of contribution. 50 Further, if the 
plaintiff is 50% or more liable, the bill eliminates the plaintiff s 
ability to recover any damages. 51 
Section 11 added a new Chapter 13, capping noneconomic 
damages at $250,000 regardless of the number of health care 
providers involved.52 Additionally, it provided a $500,000 cap for 
medical facilities regardless of the total number of defendant medical 
facilities. 53 Thus, the aggregate amount of noneconomic damages 










53. SB 3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
54. Id. 
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Section 12 provided for an effective date of July 1,2005 and made 
retroactive all actions not arising under Code sections 51-12-31, 51-
12-33, and 51-13-1.55 
Senate Committee Substitute 
The Senate Committee substitute greatly modified the bill.56 First, 
it amended Titles 33 and 43.57 Additionally, where section 2 of the 
bill as introduced allowed the plaintiff to select the venue when there 
were two or more defendants, the substitute required the court to 
make that determination. 58 
Section 3, addressing affidavits, originally required a defendant to 
file a motion to dismiss with the original responsive pleading. 59 The 
substitute allowed that filing on or before the close of discovery.60 
In section 5, the Committee substitute changed the language used 
in the explanation of the penalty provision by substituting "offeror" 
and "offeree" instead of specifically referring to the plaintiff and 
defendant. 6 I Additionally, it created a standard for nonmonetary 
claims that are more favorable than the last offer.62 It also added that 
any offer must remain open for 30 days.63 If an offer is withdrawn 
before that time, the penalty provision does not apply.64 The section 
also allowed the prevailing party to move for the fact-finder to 
determine, in a separate hearing, whether the opposing party 
presented a frivolous claim or defense and whether to impose 
damages.65 The substitute then eliminated the factors for determining 
the reasonableness of awarding attorney's fees.66 
The substitute eliminated "fault" from section 6 and replaced it 
with "mistake" and "error.,,67 
55. [d. 
56. Compare SB 3 (SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB 3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
57. Compare SB 3 (SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB 3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
58. Compare SB 3 (SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB 3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
59. SB 3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 






66. Compare SB 3 (SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB 3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
67. Compare SB 3 (SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB 3, as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
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Under section 7, the substitute provided that a doctor of osteopathy 
can testify regarding the standard of care of a medical doctor and vice 
versa.68 Additionally, an expert who is a physician can testify 
regarding the standard of care of nurses as long as he has supervised, 
taught, or instructed nurses in three of the past five years, but nurses 
cannot testify as to the standard of care of the doctor.69 Section 7 also 
specifically provided that when interpreting this Code section, courts 
are to draw on SUfreme Court rulings, such as Daubert, and other 
federal precedent. 7 
The substitute added a new section 8 to the bill, requiring every 
medical malpractice insurer to notify the Composite State Board of 
Medical Examiners when it pays a judgment or enters into an 
agreement, regardless of dollar amount, within 30 days ofpayment.71 
The substitute added a new section 9 to the bill which amended 
Code section 43-34-37, requiring the Board to investigate any doctors 
'involved in medical mal~ractice cases with judgments or settlements 
in excess of $100,000. 2 Additionally, the Board will assess the 
licensee's fitness to practice medicine if the Board disciplined the 
licensee three times in the last ten years as a result of a medical 
malpractice action.73 
The substitute then took section 8 of the bill as introduced and 
renamed it section 10.74 That section expanded the limitation beyond 
purely noneconomic damages to include all damages.75 Additionally, 
it required the fact-finder to determine whether the service provider 
met the standard of care and gave factors to use in making that 
determination.76 The substitute also eliminated the f,rovision that 
limited liability relating to specific circumstances. 7 Further, it 
changed the standard of proof from "preponderance of the evidence" 
to "clear and convincing.,,78 
68. SB 3 (SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
69. Id. 
70. Id.; see generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phanns., Inc .. 509 U.s. 579 (1993); Gen. Eiec. Co. v. 
Ioiner. 522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co., Ud. v. Carmichael. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
71. SB 3 (SCS), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Compare id.. with SB 3. as introduced, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
75. SB 3 (SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
76. Id. 
77. Compare SB 3 (SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem .. with SB 3, as introduced. 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
78. Compare SB 3 (SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem., with SB 3. as introduced. 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
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The substitute changed section 12 by allowing the consideration of 
all involved in the event, even nonparties, in apportioning fault.79 
The Committee amended section 13 to exclude earning capacity 
and domestic and other necessary services performed without 
compensation from the definition of noneconomic damages. 80 
The substitute added a new section 14 providing that if any section 
is struck down as unconstitutional, the remaining provisions will 
remain in full force. 81 
The substitute changed the effective date from July 1, 2005 to the 
day the Governor signed the bill. It also included sections 51-1-29.5 
and 51-2-5.1 to the list of sections not affected by the retroactivity 
provision.82 
Senate Motion and Debate to Engross 
Senator Preston Smith, the bill's sponsor, strongly encouraged 
engrossing the bill because "[e]xperience has taught us that there are 
certain bills that are not well perfected on the floor of the Senate. ,,83 
He recounted what happened to the prior year's tort reform bill: 163 
pages of amendments clogged the Senate floor with debate and 
destroyed the bilL 84 He then urged his fellow senators to take a 
different approach and engross this year's bill.85 Several senators 
strongly opposed engrossing such a highly contentious bill and felt 
they should debate more.86 They noted that engrossment is a rare 
congressional action, especially on a controversial bill of such high 
importance.87 The Senate voted 29 to 25 to engross the bill.88 As a 
result of the engrossment, the Senate floor did not hear several 
proposed amendments, including a substitute.89 





84. Senate Audio, supra note II (remarks by Sen. Preston Smith). 
85. Id. 
86. See id. (remarks by Sens. Robert Brown, Steve Thompson, & David Adelman). 
87. Id.; see also Interview with Sen. Kasim Reed, Senate District No. 35 (Apr. 13,2005) [hereinafter 
Reed Interview 1 ("[Elngrossing a bill as important as this piece of legislation was cowardly and I think it 
was particularly thoughtless, considering how substantial the impact is of this bill."). 
88. Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 3 (Feb. 1,2005). 
89. See Reed Interview, supra note 87. 
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Senate Floor Debate 
During the floor debate, a number of senators spoke in support and 
in opposition of the bill.90 The bill's sponsor, Senator Preston Smith 
of the 52nd district, introduced the bill.91 He provided a section by 
section analysis, discussed the major policy initiatives in Georgia, 
and addressed various questions from the floor regarding the effect 
caps would have on Georgia citizens' access to legal representation 
and the perceived discriminatory nature of a noneconomic cap.92 
Senator Smith indicated that he primarily supported the bill in an 
effort to increase overall access to quality health care.93 
Senator Judson Hill of the 32,nd district gave a narrative of his 
personal experiences resulting from medical malpractice, yet he still 
rose in support of the bill: "We as leaders must weigh the needs of 
the many while considering the needs of a few.,,94 Later, Senator 
Tommie Williams of the 19th district spoke in support of the bill due 
to his belief that the current medical crisis is forcing doctors to 
practice "defensive medicine" instead of focusing on what is best for 
the patient.95 Senator John Wiles of the 37th district spoke in favor of 
the bill by focusing on the effect of tort reform in other states and the 
need to reduce frivolous lawsuits.96 Finally, Senator Don R. Thomas 
of the 54th district spoke in favor of the bill based on the need to 
retain specialized physicians and help small businesses.97 
Various senators also rose in opposition of the bill.98 Senator Steve 
Thompson of the 33rd district opposed the bill because he did not 
believe a health care crisis existed or that a cap would lower 
insurance premiums.99 Senator Gloria Butler of the 56th district 
spoke against the bill because she believed in holding people 
accountable for their actions and maintaining access for redress. 100 
90. See Senate Audio, supra note II. 
91. [d. (remarks by Sen. Preston Smith). 
92. /d. 
93. [d. 
94. [d. (remarks by Sen. Judson Hill). 
95. [d. (remarks by Sen. Tommie Williams). 
96. See Senate Audio, supra note II (remarks by Sen. John Wiles). 
97. See ill. (remarks by Sen. Don R. Thomas). 
98. See ill. (remarks by Sens. Steve Thompson, Gloria Butler, Kasim Reed, & Emanuel Jones). 
99. See id. (remarks by Sen. Steve Thompson). 
100. See id. (remarks by Sen. Gloria Butler). 
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Senator Kasim Reed of the 35th district spoke out against SB 3 
because he believed caps would deny access to the legal system and 
competent legal representation. 101 He also expressed his view that 
there are very few unwarranted, excessive jury verdicts. 102 He 
identified California as a state where tort reform had failed to reduce 
insurance premiums, arguing that insurance reform was the only 
answer to the issue of high premiums.103 Senator Emanuel Jones of 
the 10th district favored tort reform, but he implored the Senate to 
consider SB 36 instead of SB 3 because SB 36 provided for equal 
protection while also providing equal access to affordable health 
care. 104 Finally, Senator Preston Smith closed the debate by stressing 
the need to consider the practical reality instead of focusing on an 
ideal solution. 105 The Senate passed SB 3 by a vote of 39 to 15.106 
Consideration by the House 
The House first read SB 3 on February 3, 2005.107 Although 
Speaker Glenn Richardson split the House Judiciary Committee into 
two groups at the beginning of the session for the sake of efficiency, 
ultimately the Speaker assigned the bill to a Special Committee on 
Civil Justice Reform instead of the House Judiciary Committee.108 
The House read SB 3 for the second time, and the Committee 
favorabl y reported on February 7, 2005.109 The House read the bill 
for the third time and passed it on February 10,2005.110 
101. See id. (remarks by Sen. Kasim Reed). 
102. See Senate Audio, supra note 11 (remarks by Sen. Kasim Reed). 
103. See id. 
104. See id. (remarks by Sen. Emanuel Jones). 
105. See id. (remarks by Sen. Preston Smith). 
106. Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 3 (Feb. 1,2005). 
107. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 3, Feb. 3,2005 (May 11,2005). 
108. State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 3, Feb. 3, 2005 (May II, 2005); Greg 
Bluestein, New Judiciary Leaders Gear Up for Next Round on Tort Reform, FuLTON COUNTY DAlLY 
REp., Jan. 12,2005, at 12. 
109. See State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 3, Feb. 7, 2005 (May II, 2005). 
110. See State of Georgia Final Composite Status Sheet, SB 3, Feb. 10, 2005 (May 11, 2005). 
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House Committee Substitute 
Under section 2, the House Committee resurrected the vanishing 
venue provision and codified forum non conveniens. III Under section 
3, the House Committee added audiologists and speech language 
pathologists as professions to which the code section applies. 112 
Under section 5, the House Committee limited the offer of judgment 
provision to tort claims for money, eliminated the nonmonetary 
relief, and required service by certified mail. ll3 Under section 7, the 
House Committee provided for the admissibility of all expert 
opinions in criminal actions by inserting Code section 24-9-67 and 
moving the Senate's codification of D,aubert to Code section 24-9-
67.1. 1l4 Under section 10, the House Committee added additional 
definitions to the emergency room provision, took out the provision 
covering an unborn child, and listed different examples of the factors 
needed to detennine whether the health care provider met the 
standard of care.1l5 Under Section 11, the House Committee added 
audiologists and speech pathologists to the list defining health care 
professionals. 1 16 
House Floor Debates and Amendments 
Prior to the third reading of the bill, representatives gave four floor 
amendments to the members of the House. II7 Speaker Glenn 
Richardson of the 19th district and Representative Earl Ehrhart of the 
36th district proposed Amendment 1 to the Committee substitute. II8 
This amendment changed the standard to recover under section 10 
from "willful and wanton" to "gross negligence" in the emergency 
room context.1l9 The House adopted Amendment 1 without 
Ill. Compare S8 3 (SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem .• with S8 3 (HCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
112. Compare S8 3 (SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem .• with S8 3 (HCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
113. Compare S8 3 (SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem .• with S8 3 (HCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
114. Compare S8 3 (SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem .• with S8 3 (HCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem.; see also 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms .• Inc .• 509 U.s. 579 (1993). 
115. Compare S8 3 (SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem .• with S8 3 (HCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
116. Compare S8 3 (SCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Asscm .• with S8 3 (HCS). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
117. See infra notes 118-124 and accompanying text. 
118. See S8 3 (HCSHFA). 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
119. [d. 
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objection. 12o Representatives Edward Lindsey of the 54th district and 
Wendell Willard of the 49th district proposed Amendment 2, which 
created an exception to noneconomic caps by allowing greater 
recovery for catastrophic injury. 121 Amendment 2 failed by one 
vote. 122 Speaker Glenn Richardson and Representative Earl Ehrhart 
proposed Amendment 3, which raised the noneconomic damages cap 
to $350,000 from any single medical facility, $700,000 when there 
are multiple medical. facilities, and a maximum cap of $1,050,000 
under section 13.123 The House adopted the amendment without 
objection.124 Representatives Wendell Willard and Edward Lindsey 
introduced Amendment 4, which proposed specific criteria for health 
care providers testifying as to the applicable standard of care.125 
Amendment 4 failed by a vote of 38 to 134.126 
During the floor debate, a number of representatives spoke in favor 
and against SB 3 and the various proposed amendments. 127 House 
Majority Leader Jerry Keen of the 179th district spoke to support the 
passage of SB 3 because he believed it would ensure better access to 
health care for all Georgians. 128 Representative Barry Fleming of the 
117th district gave a section by section explanation of the bill.129 
Representative Tom Rice of the 51st district based his support of SB 
3 on simple economics. 130 The simple economics were comprised of 
three factors: the increase in insurance premiums, the number of 
insurance companies leaving the state, and the number of medical 
specialists and facilities leaving the state. 131 He also provided an 
explanation for the reasonableness of the cap by noting that the 
average jury award for pain and suffering was approximately 
$250,000.132 
120. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, SB 3 (Feb. 10,2005). 
121. See Failed House Hoor Amendment to SB 3, introduced by Reps. Edward Lindsey and Wendell 
Willard, Feb. 10, 2005. 
122. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, SB 3 (Feb. 10, 2005). 
123. See SB 3 (HCSHFA), 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
124. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, SB 3 (Feb. 10,2005). 
125. See Failed House Hoor Amendment to SB 3, introduced by Reps. Edward Lindsey and Wendell 
Willard, Feb. 10, 2005. 
126. Georgia House of Representatives Voting Record, SB 3 (Feb. 10,2005). 
127. See House Audio, supra note II. 
128. [d. (remarks by Rep. Jerry Keen). 
129. [d. (remarks by Rep. Barry Heming). 
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Representative Sue Burmeister of the 119th district also spoke in 
favor of SB 3 because it would provide access to health care for 
everyone, specifically poor women. 133 Representative Ron Dodson of 
the 74th district supported SB 3 because he understood that under the 
present system, medical facilities were leaving the state. 134 
Various representatives also spoke in opposition of SB 3.135 
Representative David Ralston of the 7th district, although in favor of 
tort reform, did not like some of the details contained in SB 3.136 He 
did not like the idea of putting a value on human life and wanted 
concrete data relating to the impact of insurance on doctors, rather 
than only malpractice suitS.137 Representative Rich Golick of the 34th 
district opposed SB 3 because he believed that government should 
not put itself in the place of juries and the right to trial by jury should 
"remain an inviolate right" as guaranteed by both the federal and 
Georgia Constitutions.138 Representative Edward Lindsey of the 54th 
district opposed the bill because he believed SB 3 only acted as "a 
band-aid on a problem that needs surgery" and did not adequately 
address the important issues.139 Representative Fran Millar of the 
79th district wanted to strengthen SB 3 through adding Amendments 
1,2, and 4. 140 Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, Wendell 
Willard, spoke out against how the House conducted the process. 141 
Although he had proposed two different amendments addressing the 
need for a catastrophic injury exception, he was angry that the House 
only presented the one coupled with a $750,000 cap, instead of a 
$350,000 cap, for a vote. 142 He recognized that many would consider 
a cap of $750,000 too high but felt that a catastrophic injury 
exception was far too important of an issue for a high cap to block it 
and urged the House to pass Amendment 2.143 Representative Jill 
Chambers of the 81st district, Tom Bordeaux of the 162nd district, 
133. See House Audio, supra note 11 (remarks by Rep. Sue Burmeister). 
134. [d. (remarks by Rep. Ron Dodson). 
135. [d. (remarks by Reps. David Ralston, Rich Golick, Edward Lindsey, Fran Millar, & Wendell 
Willard). 
136. [d (remarks by Rep. David Ralston). 
137. [d. 
138. [d. (remarks by Rep. Rich Golick). 
139. See id. (remarks by Rep. Edward Lindsey). 
140. House Audio, supra note 11. 
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and Representative Vance Smith of the 129th district also spoke in 
support of Amendment 2.144 Instead of supporting Amendment 2, 
Representative Dean Douglas of the 59th district urged voting against 
all caps and voting against SB 3 in its entirety. 145 
Representative Barry Flemming of the 117th district and Chairman 
of the Special Committee on Civil Justice Reform, rose to speak 
against Amendment 4 and Amendment 2 and urged voting for the 
original bill instead. 146 House Speaker Glenn Richardson then rose in 
support of Amendment l' s change in the emergency room care 
standard from willful and wanton negligence to gross negligence and 
Amendment 3' s cap increase from $250,000 to $350,000.147 
The House passed the amended Committee substitute to SB 3 by a 
vote of 136 to 34. 148 
Senate Reconsideration 
Senator Preston Smith, the bill's sponsor, s,Ps0ke in support of a 
motion to agree to the House changes to SB 3.1 9 He summarized the 
major changes the House made to each section of the bill. 150 He 
concluded with a plea to adopt the House version of SB 3. 151 During 
questioning, Senator Smith noted that Mag Mutual, Georgia's largest 
medical malpractice insurance provider, indicated it would continue 
to honor the 10% rollback of insurance premiums upon the adoption 
of the House version of SB 3.152 
Several senators rose in opposition of the motion to agree. 153 
Senator Steve Thompson of the 33rd district urged further 
consideration by a Conference Committee and stressed that the 
amendment for the $750,000 cap only failed in the House by one 
144. See id. (remarks by Reps. Jill Chambers, Tom Bordeaux, & Vance Smith) 
145. [d. (remarks by Rep. Dean Douglas). 
146. House Audio, supra note 11 (remarks by Rep. Barry Fieming). 
147. [d. (remarks by Rep. Glenn Richardson). 
148. [d. 
149. See Audio Recording of Senate Proceedings, Feb. 10, 2005, 
http://www.georgia.gov/00/articleJO,2086,4802_61 071 03_33091490,OO.htrnl [hereinafter Senate Audio 




153. [d. (remarks by Sens. Steve Thompson, Robert Brown, & Seth Harp). 
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vote, thus demonstrating the need for further debate. 154 Senator 
Robert Br.own of the 26th district strongly urged the Senate to send 
the bill to Conference Committee because the senators had not had an 
opportunity to debate the bill due to engrossment.155 Finally, Senator 
Seth Harp of the 29th district expressed concern that the bill 
"cheapen[ed] life" because gross negligence was still too high of a 
standard and the emergency room provision granted immunity for all 
damages, not just noneconomic damages. 156 The motion to agree 
failed by a vote of 28 to 27. 157 
Senate Adoption of House Substitute 
On February 14, 2005, Senator Preston Smith again rose to speak 
in favor of adopting the House Substitute to SB 3.158 He warned that 
if the Senate did not adopt the House Substitute, the bill would have 
to go to the Conference Committee where the Senate would urge 
passing the $250,000 cap as well as the other provisions originally 
passed by the Senate. 159 He further warned that if the bill went to 
Conference Committee, the Committee could lower the cap even 
further. 160 Instead of risking the uncertainty of the bill going through 
Conference Committee, he felt that adopting the House Substitute 
was a "reasonable and necessary compromise.,,161 
Senator David Adelman from the 42nd district then rose in 
opposition to the adoption of the House substitute to SB 3.162 He 
specifically addressed the provision regarding the standard of proof 
necessary for recovery in an emergency room setting. 16 He 
expressed his opinion that requiring proof of gross negligence by 
clear and convincing evidence was too burdensome, especially in a 
154. See Senate Audio n, supra note 149 (remarks by Sen. Steve Thompson). 
155. [d. (remarks by Sen. Robert Brown). 
156. [d. (remarks by Sen. Seth Harp). 
157. Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 3 (Feb. 10,2005). 
158. See Audio Recording of Senate Proceedings, Feb. 14, 2005, 
hnp:/Iwww.georgia.gov/00/artic1e/O,2086,4802_61 071 03_33091490,oo.html [hereinafter Senate Audio 
1m (remarks by Sen. Preston Smith). 
159. See id. 
160. See id. 
161. See id. 
162. [d. (remarks by Sen. David Adelman). 
163. [d. 
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case of catastrophic injury. 164 He wanted the bill to go to Conference 
Committee to slow the process down and fix the bill at that time, 
instead of gambling on the legislature amending the bill later.165 
Senator Steve Thompson of the 33rd district also voiced concerns 
about relying on promises that the legislature would fix the bill later 
and instead urged sending the bill to Conference Committee.166 
Senator Robert Brown of the 26th district described the bill as 
"flawed" and encouraged sending the bill to a Conference 
Committee.167 Senator Kasim Reed of the 35th district also spoke in 
opposition of passing the House Substitute and referenced the 
Senate's prior vote against the House Substitute!68 He warned that 
although many took "heat" for their votes, it was the best vote for the 
people. 169 In the end, the Senate adopted the House Substitute by a 
vote of 38 to 15.170 
Analysis 
Constitutional Issues 
Georgia's Tort Reform Act has already faced and will continue to 
face constitutional challenges to many of its provisions. Unclear 
language and apparently conflicting goals in a number of areas have 
left the law open to vagueness challenges. 171 Furthermore, where the 
law appears to favor defendants over plaintiffs, plaintiffs will 
challenge the law on equal protection grounds. l72 Also, certain 
portions of the Act may violate specific provisions in the Georgia 
Constitution. 173 
164. Senate Audio ill, supra note 158 (remarks by Sen. David Adelman). 
165. [d. 
166. [d. (remarks by Sen. Steve Thompson). 
167. [d. (remarks by Sen. Robert Brown). 
168. [d. (remarks by Sen. Kasim Reed). 
169. [d. 
170. Georgia Senate Voting Record, SB 3 (Feb. 14, 2005). 
171. See Ted Carter, Tort Reform lAw May Need Overhaul, Bus. REP. &J., Mar. 28, 2005, 
http://www.savannahbusiness.comlmain.asp?SectionlD=29&articleid=2877. 
172. [d. 
173. See Greg Bluestein, DeKalb Judge Deals First Blow to Tort Reform lAw, FuLTON COUNTY 
DAILY REp., Mar. 23, 2005, at 1. 
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One general challenge to the Act as a whole could come under 
Georgia's single subject rule. 174 The Georgia Constitution provides 
that "no bill shall pass which refers to m~re than one subject matter 
or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title 
thereof.,,175 While opponents have argued that this Act is truly 
omnibus legislation, Georgia courts have held that so long as there is 
some relationship between subjects within an act, there is no 
constitutional violation. 176 
On March 21, 2005, DeKalb State Court Judge J. Antonio 
DelCampo ruled that Code section 9-10-31(c) of the Tort Reform 
Act's section 2 conflicted with venue provisions in the Georgia 
Constitution. 177 Code section 9-10-31(c) allows any nonresident 
defendant in a medical malpractice action to transfer the action to that 
defendant's home county if that is where the events giving rise to the 
claim occurred. 178 But the Georgia Constitution provides that "[s]uits 
against . . . joint tortfeasors . . . residing in different counties may be 
tried in either county." 179 Noting that statutes cannot vary 
constitutional venue provisions, Judge DelCampo held that this 
statutory venue provision impermissibly narrowed the plaintiff s 
rights under Georgia's Constitution.180 The Georgia Supreme Court 
has subsequently granted an interlocutory appeal to this decision, 
which will lead to the fITst ultimate decision as to the constitutionality 
of any portion of the Act. 181 
Of all of the provisions in SB 3, the Act's offer of judgment 
provision is perhaps the most likely to see a challenge for 
vagueness. 182 While it is clear that the purpose of the provision is to 
encourage parties in tort cases to accept legitimate offers for 
settlement, it is unclear as to what constitutes a reasonable offer and 
what consequences will ensue if a party does not accept that offer. 183 
174. See Charles M. Cork, m, Constitutional Issues, Materials for SB 3 Seminar, 8-9 (Mar. I, 2005) 
(on file with the Georgia State University Law Review). 
175. GA. CONST. art. m, § V, para. m. 
176. See Cork, supra note 174. 
177. Bluestein, supra note 173. 
178. See O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31 (Supp. 2005). 
179. GA. CONST. art. VI, § II, para. IV. 
180. See Bluestein, supra note 173. 
181. 2005 Granted Interlocutory Applications, Supreme Court of Georgia, http://www.gasupreme.us 
(last visited Feb. 7, 2006) (remitted to lower court, case no. S0511162, EHCA Cartersville v. Turner). 
182. See Chance, supra note 176; O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 (Supp. 2005). 
183. See Chance, supra note 176. 
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Subsection (b) provides that when a party receiving a settlement offer 
("the offeree") does not accept that offer and later fails to obtain a 
judgment "at least 25 percent more favorable than [that] offer," the 
offeree is liable for attorney's fees and costs. 184 However, Subsection 
(d) of the Act also sets forth a method for determining the 
reasonableness of an offer: "If the offer of judgment was 25 percent 
more favorable than the monetary award, the court shall award 
reasonable attorney's fees and costS.,,185 
Thus, although the subsections both serve the purpose of 
encouraging settlement, they also support different methods of 
calculation, possibly depending on who makes the offer. 186 For 
instance, if the defendant makes the offer, it is unclear whether the 
plaintiff must obtain a judgment that exceeds that offer by at least 
25%, or whether the offer must have been less than 75% of the final 
judgment. 187 Furthermore, if the plaintiff makes the offer, it is unclear 
whether the defendant must receive a judgment equal to 75% of the 
last offer or less, or whether that offer must not have exceeded the 
final judgment by 25%.188 Ultimately, when calculating these 
percentages, the critical question is which number-"offer" or 
"judgment"-is the numerator and which is the denominator. 189 The 
answer to that question is not clear from the text of the Act, making 
due process challenges to this provision likely.190 Furthermore, 
because this provision applies only to tort claims, it could be subject 
to equal protection challenges as well. 191 
The Act's adoption, in section 7, of the Daubert standard for the 
admissibility of expert testimony in civil cases, creates the potential 
for a challenge on an equal protection basis. 192 By adopting more 
stringent requirements for the admissibility of expert testimony in 
184. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 (Supp. 2005). 
185. See id. 
186. See Chance, supra note 176. 
187. See AI Pearson, Offer of Settlement in Georgia, Materials for SB 3 Seminar (Mar. 1,2005) (on 
file with the Georgia State University Law Review). 
188. [d. 
189. See id. 
190. [d. 
191. [d. 
192. Robert E. Shields & Lesley J. Bryan, Georgia's New Expert Witness Rule: Daubert and More, in 
INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, GEORGIA'S NEWLY ENACTED 2005 TORT REFORM 
LAW, SENATE BILL 3, ANALYSIS AND PRACTICE TIPs 20 (2005); O.c.G.A. § 24-9-67 (Supp. 2005); 
Daubert v. Merrell Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
21
: TORTS AND CIVIL PRACTICE Civil Practice and Procedure Generally:
Published by Reading Room, 2005
242 GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:221 
civil cases than in criminal cases, the legislature has varied the 
admissibility of expert testimony depending on whether that 
testimony is presented in a criminal case or a civil case. 193 
Furthermore, the intent that "the courts of the State of Georgia not be 
viewed as open to expert testimony that would not be admissible in 
other states" creates another constitutional question of vagueness. 194 
Since different states use different standards for the admissibility of 
expert testimony, is the legislature directing the state courts to refuse 
to admit evidence that no other state would admit?195 Does Georgia 
now have the "strictest" standards for the admissibility of expert 
testimony, or does a state court merely need to ensure it does not 
allow testimony that no other state would allow?196 Again, because 
the text does not answer these questions, it is likely that this provision 
is also ripe for constitutional challenges. 197 
Plaintiffs bringing medical malpractice claims can challenge caps 
on damages for violation of equal protection on the grounds that the 
Act treats medical malpractice victims and other tort victims 
differently.198 Similarly, these plaintiffs can challenge such caps on 
the grounds that they treat less seriously injured plaintiffs differently 
from these more seriously injured by allowing the former to receive 
total compensation for their injuries while preventing the latter from 
doing SO.199 Courts in other states are split on whether or not these 
arguments justify invalidating such provisions.2oo Recently, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down that state's cap on 
noneconomic damages, noting that where "the legislature shifts the 
economic burden of medical malpractice from insurance companies 
and negligent health care providers to a small group of vulnerable, 
injured patients, the legislative action does not appear rational.,,201 
Another argument for the unconstitutionality of caps is that by 
altering the jury's ability to give awards that it sees fit, caps deprive 
193. Shields & Bryan, supra note 192; O.C.O.A. § 24-9-67 (supp. 2005); Daubert, 509 U.S. 579. 
194. Shields & Bryan, supra note 192; O.CO.A. § 24-9-67 (supp. 2005); Daubert, 509 U.S. 579. 
195. See Shields & Bryan, supra note 192. 
196. Id. 
197. See id. 
198. See Carol A. Crocca, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutory 
Provisions Limiting Amount of Recovery in Medical Malpractice Claims, 26 A.L.R. 5th 245, 266 (2005). 
199. See id. 
200. See id. 
201. Ferdon v. Wis. Patients' Compo Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 466 (Wis. 2005). 
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parties of the right to trial by jury guaranteed under the Seventh 
Amendment. 202 Again, courts in other states have split on whether 
caps on recovery violate the Seventh Amendment. 203 A plaintiff 
could make a similar argument that this provision violates a 
plaintiff s access to the court system, which the Georgia Constitution 
guarantees. 204 
Section 15 of the Act indicates that, with the exception of the 
provisions relating to joint and several liability, emergency medical 
care, agency, and caps on noneconomic damages, the Act intends to 
apply to future claims as well as all pending cases, unless such 
retroactive application would be unconstitutiona1.205 This has already 
created some litigation as to whether or not retroactive application of 
a particular provision is unconstitutiona1.206 Judge Melodie Clayton 
in the State Court of Cobb County and Judge Hermann Coolidge in 
the State Court of Chatham County have both already ruled that 
application of the Daubert expert testimony standards to cases in 
which the parties have prepared for trial under the previous, less strict 
standards would violate due process?07 Parties are already litigating 
the constitutionality of retroactive application of the new affidavit 
requirements in malpractice cases.208 
Federal Preemption Issues 
In section 4, the Act added Code section 9-11-9.2 to require a 
medical malpractice plaintiff to file a medical authorization form at 
the time he files the complaint or risk dismissal?09 This form 
authorizes the defendant's attorney to obtain and disclose private 
information contained in medical records pertaining to the 
202. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law ... the right of trial by jury shall be 
preserved."). 
203. See Crocca, supra note 198. 
204. See GA. CONST. art. L § I, para. IV. 
205. See O.c.G.A. §§ 51-12-31, 51-12-33, 51-1-29.5, 51-2-51.1, & 51-13-1 (Supp. 2005). 
206. See Interview with Stephen Chance, Esq., Partner & Joe Watkins, Esq., Partner, Watkins, Lourie, 
Roll, & Chance, P.C., in Atlanta, Ga. (Apr. 18,2005). 
207. See Ken Shigley, Retroactive Application of New Expert Rules Unconstitutional, ATLANTA 
INJURY LAW BLOG, May 7,2005, http://www.atlantainjurylawblog.com; Daubert v. Merrell Pharms., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
208. See Chance, supra note 172. 
209. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.2 (Supp. 2005); see also Stephen Chance, SB3's Changes to O.C.G.A. § 
9-11-9.1, Materials for SB 3 Seminar (Mar. 1,2005) (on file with the Georgia State University Law 
Review). 
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plaintiff.210 Opponents of the Act have noted that, at least in certain 
cases, this requirement could directly conflict with the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIP AA), 
which Congress designed to prevent unauthorized disclosure of 
private health information.211 Under HIPAA, if a state law directly 
conflicts with one of its provisions or regulations, HIP AA preempts 
that state law. 212 
Policy Issues 
With the passage of caps on noneconomic damages in medical 
malpractice cases, the Georgia General Assembly has taken a step 
towards controlling the increasing insurance rates for physicians in 
the state.213 But no one knows what effect this legislation will have. 
Proponents of such caps point to similar legislation in other states 
like Texas and Ohio, where insurance rates have decreased in the 
. d' h d h 214 years sInce passage an more Insurers ave returne to testate. 
Proponents often cite California, in particular, as the model of tort 
reform, because it enacted a noneconomic damages cap in 1975 and 
has effectively controlled insurance rates in recent years.215 But 
opponents of damages caps note that California's insurance rates did 
not truly lower until ten years after the legislature put the damages 
cap in place-when the legislature passed insurance reform laws that 
capped insurance rates.216 Furthermore, opponents note that placing 
limits on noneconomic damages results in denial of recovery to the 
most severely injured victims and greatly reduces the potential 
recovery for injured non-professionals-particularly homemakers 
210. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.2 (2005); see also Chance, supra note 209. 
211. See 45 C.P.R. § 164.508 (2005); see also Chance, supra note 209. 
212. See 45 C.P.R. § 160.203 (2005); see also Chance, supra note 209. 
213. SB 3, as passed, 2005 Ga. Gen. Assem. 
214. See Michael Norbut, Three 'Crisis' States Show Improvement Since Tort Reform, HEALTH CARE 
NEWS (May 1,2005), http://www.heartland.orglArticle.cfm?artId=16859; see also Senate Audio, supra 
note II (remarks by Sen. John Wiles). 
215. See William K. Scheuber & Bradford P. Cohn, California MICRA, the National Model in Tort 
Reform, SAN FRANCISCO MEDICINE (Mar. 2(03). 
216. See Medical Malpractice Fibs and Facts, http://www.iltla.com/Medical 
Malpractice/medmaIfibsandfacts.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2006). 
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and children.217 The debate over the costs and benefits of damages 
caps is ongoing and apparently endless.218 
Opponents of SB 3 also argue that the Act's abolition of joint and 
several liability "results in a completely innocent plaintiff's inability 
to collect the full amount of an award of damages.,,219 Furthermore, 
they argue that this change is likely to increase litigation, because it 
encourages defendants to seek "as many other responsible parties as 
possible in order to decrease its relative degree of total fault.'.22O 
Also, plaintiffs will have little incentive to settle with defendants 
because other defendants will later exaggerate the settling 
defendant's negligence to reduce their own proportional liability. 221 
Finally, by forcing juries to consider not only the liability of the 
litigants but also non-parties, the Act adds to the complexity of 
litigation and stands to increase the associated costS.222 
While proponents of the Act's "offer of judgment" provision argue 
that it encourages parties to accept reasonable settlement offers and 
will decrease litigation, opponents argue that such measures are 
unnecessary, as "95% of civil cases filed are [already] settled without 
the need for trial.,,223 Furthermore, opponents argue that wealthy 
defendants could bully private citizen plaintiffs into accepting "low 
ball" offers out of fear that they will have to pay attorney's fees that 
"could financially destroy the net worth of a middle class citizen.,,224 
Opponents point out that the American Bar Association's model law 
on offers of judgment caps the amount recoverable by an offering 
defendant at the amount of the plaintiff's award-preventing a 
plaintiff from having to pay more than the he recovers.225 The ABA's 
217. See, e.g., Kevin Lamb, Exposing the Myths of Tort Reform, DAYTON DAILY NEWS 
(Ohio), Oct. 26, 2004, at E2; see also Senate Audio, supra note II (remarks by Sen. Steve 
Thompson). 
218. See supra notes 204-207 and accompanying text. 
219. Charles M. Cork, m, S83: Abolition of Joint Liability, in INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL 
EDUCATION IN GEORGIA, GEORGIA'S NEWLY ENACfED 2005 TORT REFORM LAW, SENATE BILL 3, 
ANALYSIS AND PRACTICAL TIPs 5 (2005). 
220. [d. 
221. [d. at 6. 
222. [d. 
223. See Senate Audio, supra note II (remarks by Sen. Preston Smith); Matthew C. Aoumoy, 
Georgia's Newly Enacted 2005 Law on Offer of Judgment or Settlement (OJS) O.CG.A. 9-11-68 (a) to 
(d) (Section 5 ofS.B. 3), in INSTITUTE OF CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION IN GEORGIA, GEORGIA'S 
NEWLY ENACfED 2005 TORT REFORM LAW, SENATE BILL 3, ANALYSIS AND PRACTICAL TIPs 6-7 
(2005). 
224. Aoumoy, supra note 223 at 7 (2005). 
225. [d. at 14. 
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model law also allows the judge discretion to reduce or eliminate fees 
to avoid hardship or injustice.226 
Opponents also argue that instead of decreasing litigation, section 
5 could increase litigation by dividing each lawsuit into two trials: 
one on the merits of the case, and another to determine whether a 
party is entitled to costs based on the adequacy or inadequacy of an 
offer of judgment. 227 Finally, opponents note that there is no legal 
duty to settle a case, that no party should suffer for insisting on the 
litigation of a nonfrivolous claim, and that it is "unfair to punish a 
Party ... simply because the Party has no crystal ball upon which to 
accurately predict the jury verdict in a tort trial.,,228 
Conclusion 
While some see the passage of SB 3 as the first step towards major 
civil justice reform in Georgia, the Act's drafting and policy choices 
leave questions as to how effective it will be in practice.229 The next 
legislative session will undoubtedly see the proposal of legislation 
intended not only to further reform the civil justice system, but also 
to remedy some of the constitutional problems that have become 
apparent since the passage of the Act. 230 In the meantime, attorneys 
will continue to challenge the constitutionality of SB 3, and courts 
will continue to decide the validity of the Act's provisions. As both 
politicians and the public continue to debate the pros and cons of tort 
reform, only time will tell whether the benefits of such legislation 
outweigh the costs. 
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